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Abstract  
This paper analyses the effect of foreign acquisition on survival probability and employment growth of 
target plant using data on Swedish manufacturing plants during the period 1993-2002.  An improvement 
over previous studies is that we take into account firm level heterogeneity by separating the targeted 
plants into those within Swedish MNEs, Swedish exporting non-MNEs, and purely domestic firms 
before foreign takeover. The results, controlling for possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy 
using an IV and propensity score matching approach suggest that acquisition by foreign owners 
increases the lifetime of the acquired plants only if the plant was an exporter.  The effect differs 
depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical.  We also find robust positive employment 
growth effects only for exporters, and only if the takeover is vertical, not horizontal.   
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In this paper we study in detail the implications of foreign acquisitions for the survival and employment 
growth prospects of the target plants.  We investigate firstly plant closures as the adjustment along the 
extensive margin, as they are an important aspect of industry dynamics, shaping industry productivity and 
forming the competitive landscape in an economy.  We also, however, consider the intensive margin of 
adjustment by examining what happens to employment growth in surviving firms after acquisitions.  We 
use recent unique detailed plant level data (which also provide some information at the firm level) for 
Sweden to investigate survival probabilities in the context of a hazard model.  We take particular account 
of the potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision using two different econometric approaches. 
We extend and improve upon the earlier literature in a number of ways.  First, we examine acquisitions by 
foreign multinationals and use different econometric approaches to be able to identify the causal effect of 
takeovers on exit probability and employment growth changes of a plant.  Second, using the detailed and 
unique data for Sweden we are able to link our empirical work to the recent literature on firm 
heterogeneity in international trade.  Specifically, we are able to categorize all domestic firms into being 
either (i) a domestic firm with affiliates abroad, (ii) a domestic firm with export sales (and no foreign 
affiliates) and (iii) a purely domestic firm with no involvement on foreign markets.  We refer to (i) and (ii) as 
domestic multinationals and domestic exporters, respectively, in what follows.  Theoretical heterogeneous 
firm models would predict that these types of plants are intrinsically different.  We therefore analyse 
whether the extent of global engagement of the plant (multinational, exporting, none) impacts on plant 
survival through mediating the impact of foreign acquisition on the target.   
The quality of our data also allows further novelties in our research design.  Firstly, we can use our data to 
identify domestic acquisitions.  This allows us to investigate whether our foreign acquisition effect merely 
reflects a “pure acquisition effect” that would be similar for domestic acquisitions also, or whether there is 
a particular “foreign effect”.  Due to data limitations, not many studies that have investigated foreign 
acquisitions have been able to take this into account.  Secondly, we investigate whether the effect of 
acquisitions is different depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical.   
We find, after controlling for the possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy and also controlling for a 
number of plant and firm specific characteristics, that foreign acquisition has an effect on plant survival 
only for domestic exporters.  Depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal (i.e., within the same 
industry) or vertical, acquired exporters have 20 to 30, or 6 to 8 percent higher survival probabilities, 
respectively, compared to plants of non-acquired firms.  We also find that employment growth is higher in 
takeover targets that were exporters prior to acquisition.   
  
Foreign acquisition, plant survival, and employment growth  
 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main aspects of current day globalization.  The 
total volume of world-wide FDI has increased tremendously in the last two decades.   
UNCTAD (2007) shows that, in 2006, total FDI flows amounted to 1.3 trillion USD, 
contributing to a total world-wide FDI stock of roughly 12 trillion USD – equivalent to about 
25 percent of world GDP.  At the same time it is well known that the majority of FDI flows 
are due to international mergers and acquisitions (M&A) rather than setting up new projects 
abroad (greenfield).  Again, UNCTAD (2007) shows that in 2006 the total value of world-
wide cross-border M&As was roughly 0.9 trillion USD, amounting to about 70 percent of 
total FDI flows.
1 
 
These trends have brought international mergers into the academic debate, with recent 
literature attempting to model these activities theoretically and providing empirical evidence 
on their determinants (e.g., Neary, 2007, Hijzen et al., 2008, Head and Ries, 2008).   
Moreover, the growing importance of M&As has given rise to policy concerns as to the 
impact of such cross-border mergers for domestic economies.  From the point of view of the 
host country, a potential downside is that a foreign multinational acquiring a domestic firm 
may shut down the plant or part thereof completely after acquisition, or reduce employment.
2  
On the positive side, however, a foreign acquisition may bring new technology and market 
access opportunities and, thus, strengthen the overall competitiveness and survival prospects 
of the takeover target.   
 
In this paper we study in detail the implications of foreign acquisitions for the survival and 
employment growth prospects of the target plants.  We investigate firstly plant closures as the 
adjustment along the extensive margin, as they are an important aspect of industry dynamics, 
                                                 
1 Strictly speaking the UNCTAD data on FDI and M&A are not fully comparable as they come from different 
sources.  Still, they give a good indication of the importance of M&A.   
2 Recall, for example, the public debate surrounding the Vodafone takeover of the German company 
Mannesmann in 1999 / 2000: http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1999/11/feature/de9911220f.htm (accessed 
on 7 August 2008).   shaping industry productivity and forming the competitive landscape in an economy.
3  We 
also, however, consider the intensive margin of adjustment by examining what happens to 
employment growth in surviving firms after acquisitions.  We use recent unique detailed plant 
level data (which also provide some information at the firm level) for Sweden to investigate 
survival probabilities in the context of a hazard model.  We take particular account of the 
potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision (for example due to “cherry picking”) by 
implementing an instrumental variables approach.  Furthermore, we check the robustness of 
the IV approach with estimations on a matched sample of firms based on propensity score 
matching.   
 
Sweden is an interesting case to analyze in this context.  Over the last two decades Sweden 
has introduced a considerable amount of liberalization reforms in order to promote foreign 
ownership. However, it was not until 1995, that in connection with Swedish membership in 
the European Union (EU) the business climate improved considerably and Swedish firms 
became more attractive targets for foreign investors. Ever since then, Sweden has witnessed a 
rapid increase of inward FDI, mainly through mergers and acquisitions. Well-known former 
Swedish owned multinational enterprises, such as Astra, Pharmacia, Volvo Car and Saab 
Automobile, changed ownership in the 1990s and are now foreign owned. At the beginning of 
the 2000s, the employment share in foreign owned firms in manufacturing was among the 
highest in OECD.
4 
 
The empirical evidence on the impact of foreign acquisitions on survival probabilities is rather 
limited.  A few studies, e.g. Bernard and Sjöholm (2003) for Indonesia, and van Beveren 
(2007) for Belgium document differences in survival rates between foreign multinationals and 
domestic plants (the latter paper distinguishing domestic multinationals from purely domestic 
plants).
5  These studies indicate that the probability of shutdown is larger for plants that are 
part of a multinational, at least when controlling for other factors related to plant survival.  As 
                                                 
3 It is also one aspect of plant outcomes that is still under-researched.  By contrast, productivity and wage effects 
of foreign acquisitions have received far higher attention in the literature.  See, for example, papers by Arnold 
and Javorcik (2005), Girma and Görg (2007a,b), Harris and Robinson (2002), Petkova (2007), Fukao et al. 
(2006).  A related literature also considers the effect of changes in managerial ownership and firm performance, 
e.g., Harris et al. (2005) and Coles et al. (2007).   
4 As compared to 21 other OECD countries in 2002, only Ireland, Luxembourg and Hungary had larger 
employment shares than Sweden in foreign owned firms in manufacturing (Hansson et.al. 2007). 
5 Another related study is by Bernard and Jensen (2007) who focus on differences in plant survival rates in US 
manufacturing between plants within domestic US multinationals and other plants.  They do not distinguish the 
takeover by a foreign firm.   
  1to studying the effect of a foreign acquisition on survival, one of the few papers to have 
looked at this is Girma and Görg (2004).  They find evidence that foreign acquisition reduces 
the lifetime of acquired UK plants in electronics and food industries.   
 
There is a somewhat richer literature on employment effects of acquisition, but this is by no 
means exhaustive.  For example, Conyon et al (2002) using firm level data for the UK find 
that labour demand of the typical firm decreased somewhat in the years following foreign 
acquisition.  Huttunen (2007) and Almeida (2007) using data for Finland and Portugal 
respectively, focus on employment by skill groups.  Huttunen finds that foreign acquisition 
decreases the share of high skilled workers in targets, while Almeida finds no significant 
effects on relative employment of skills in Portugal.   
 
We extend and improve upon these earlier papers in a number of ways.  First, we examine 
acquisitions by foreign multinationals and use different econometric approaches to be able to 
identify the causal effect of takeovers on exit probability and employment growth changes of 
a plant.  Second, using the detailed and unique data for Sweden we are able to link our 
empirical work to the recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade (e.g, 
Helpman et al., 2004).  Specifically, we are able to categorize all domestic firms into being 
either (i) a domestic firm with affiliates abroad, (ii) a domestic firm with export sales (and no 
foreign affiliates) and (iii) a purely domestic firm with no involvement on foreign markets.  
We refer to (i) and (ii) as domestic multinationals and domestic exporters, respectively, in 
what follows.  Theoretical heterogeneous firm models would predict that these types of plants 
are intrinsically different.  We therefore analyse whether the extent of global engagement of 
the plant (multinational, exporting, none) impacts on plant survival through mediating the 
impact of foreign acquisition on the target.   
 
The quality of our data also allows further novelties in our research design.  Firstly, we can 
use our data to identify domestic acquisitions.  This allows us to investigate whether our 
foreign acquisition effect merely reflects a “pure acquisition effect” that would be similar for 
domestic acquisitions also, or whether there is a particular “foreign effect”.  Due to data 
limitations, not many studies that have investigated foreign acquisitions have been able to 
take this into account.  Secondly, we investigate whether the effect of acquisitions is different 
depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal or vertical.  This has, to the best of our 
  2knowledge, not been investigated in earlier studies.
6  Finally, our data combines plant level 
with firm level information and is therefore able to control for the role of firm attributes for 
plant survival.  Bernard and Jensen (2007) is one of the few other papers in the literature that 
are able to do so.  They include a dummy for plants that are part of a multiplant firm.  We do 
not only this but are also able to investigate whether plants probability of exit is influenced by 
whether or not other plants within the same firm failed in the same period.   
 
To preview our results, we find, after controlling for the possible endogeneity of the 
acquisition dummy and also controlling for a number of plant and firm specific 
characteristics, that foreign acquisition has an effect on plant survival only for domestic 
exporters.  Depending on whether the acquisition is horizontal (i.e., within the same industry) 
or vertical, acquired exporters have 20 to 30, or 6 to 8 percent higher survival probabilities, 
respectively, compared to plants of non-acquired firms.  We also find that employment 
growth is higher in takeover targets that were exporters prior to acquisition.   
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses some background to 
motivate our empirical analysis.  Section 3 presents the data and illustrates the increased 
importance of foreign ownership in Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. Section 4 discusses 
the analytical framework and empirical results for the effect of foreign acquisitions on plant 
survival, while Section 5 focuses on employment growth effects.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Theoretical and empirical motivation 
 
Conceptually, the effect of a foreign acquisition on the survival and employment growth 
prospects in the target plant are not unambiguous.  In the standard models of multinationals, 
these types of firms are generally assumed to have some sort of firm specific asset or 
efficiency advantage that enables them to operate abroad successfully (Markusen, 2002; 
Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple, 2003).  If a foreign multinational then takes over a domestic plant, 
it may be likely that some of the firm specific asset is transferred to the takeover target in 
terms of technology, know-how, skills, etc..  This, in turn, may increase survival prospects 
                                                 
6 Moreover, unlike some of the earlier studies, our data allows us to be confident that we observe true exits in our 
data set; these are not due to plants disappearing from the data due to mergers and acquisitions or because they 
drop in size below a certain cut-off level. The former is a potential issue in Mata and Portugal (2002), while the 
latter problem potentially affects the study by Van Beveren (2007).  
  3and raise employment growth (and other aspects of firm performance) in the acquired target.  
One may call this a benevolent view of the actions of the acquirer.   
 
A different view may be that multinationals, due to their advantages, may use foreign 
acquisitions in order to gain market access and eliminate competition by taking over a rival 
and closing it down afterwards, or reducing substantially the scale of operations and therefore 
reducing employment (e.g., Thompson, 1999).  In this case, the expected effects of a foreign 
acquisition on survival and growth would clearly be negative.   
 
An argument with similar predicted outcomes can be constructed around the empirical 
observation that foreign owned multinationals are generally more “footloose” than domestic 
firms in the host country (e.g., Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003).  This is attributed to their 
possibilities of relocating production and employment among their affiliates in different 
countries and, hence, their ability to respond more quickly to changes in the business 
environment in alternative host countries.  If this is the case, then the change in ownership 
may lead to lower survival probabilities and employment growth in the takeover target, as the 
multinational owner may be quicker to shut down or reduce employment in the plant once it is 
part of the multinational firm structure.   
 
The effects of foreign acquisitions may still be ambiguous a priori even when distinguishing 
acquisitions motivated by either horizontal or vertical motives.  For the former, firms acquire 
plants abroad in order to gain market access.  If the aim of the market access is to eliminate 
competition and consolidate the industry, then it is likely that it may lead to plan closures and 
plant downsizing.  On the other hand, the acquisition may be designed to open new markets 
by using the already existing facilities owned by other firms in the foreign markets, i.e., the 
acquirer intends to “grow by acquisition”.  Then the acquirer is likely to maintain the plant 
network that is already available, and improve them through technology transfers in order to 
suit its own needs.  In this case, the prospects for the acquired target would be positive in 
terms of both survival and employment growth.   
 
This may be different for non-horizontal, in particular vertical acquisitions.  If the motive is to 
acquire plants at different stages of the production process, then it is likely that this is done 
with a view to integrating these into the multinational company structure.  In this case, the 
  4acquirer may transfer technology and improve quality in the acquisition target, leading to 
improvements in survival and employment prospects.   
 
For acquisitions that are not related through input-output linkages or horizontal motives, 
foreign acquirers may use the acquisition as a device to acquire access to the country, 
technology, skills, etc. through the acquisition, even if it is not immediately linked into the 
production process.  Once these resources have been ingested the acquiring firm may divest 
itself of the acquired establishment, and source its requirements from its plants elsewhere 
(Thompson, 1999).  Hence, in this case, there would be clear negative effects on survival 
probabilities in the takeover target after foreign acquisition.   
 
Another consideration when formulating expectations concerning the post acquisition effects 
relates to the characteristics of the acquisition target.  Since plants of globally engaged firms 
tend to be a priori “better” along a line of observable and (to the econometrician) 
unobservable characteristics they may be able to experience different effects if they are 
acquired.  As established in the recent literature on heterogeneous firms in international trade, 
there is theoretical justification and empirical evidence for the findings that multinationals 
tend to be the most productive firms, followed by exporters who are not multinationals, and 
that firms without any foreign involvement are the least productive.  This may have 
implications for their post acquisition expectations.   
 
In particular, “better” targets are likely to be able to absorb technology transfers from the 
foreign acquirer more easily.  However, since plants of domestic multinationals are already at 
a similar level of technology as foreign multinationals (Criscuolo and Martin, 2008) we may 
not expect that foreign acquisition improve their survival prospects or employment growth.  
Furthermore, since domestic multinationals are already highly footloose (similar to foreign 
multinationals), we would not necessarily expect that foreign acquisition increases 
substantially their exit probabilities.  Hence, if foreign acquisitions are accompanied by 
technology transfers, we expect these to be most effective for targets that are exporting plants, 
but not necessarily in multinational plants, compared to targets in purely domestic firms.  This 
is because the evidence shows that exporters are more productive than purely domestic firms 
(Wagner, 2007), while domestic multinationals outperform exporters (Greenaway and 
Kneller, 2007) and are more similar to foreign multinationals (Criscuolo and Martin, 2008).  
  5We therefore expect to see larger positive effects of foreign acquisitions on plant survival and 
employment growth for targets that were already exporters.   
 
 
3.  A first look at the data 
 
The data used in this paper are uniquely assembled and combine data from Statistics Sweden 
(SCB) and the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies (ITPS).  The data consist of three 
register-based datasets where information at the plant and firm-level are linked together by a 
unique identification code.  Our period of observation covers 1993 to 2002. 
 
Statistics Sweden provided two datasets, the Regional Labor Market Statistics (RAMS) and 
Financial Statistics (FC).  The former contains information at the plant-level for the 
population of manufacturing plants on variables such as total employment, the number of 
employees with post-secondary education, and age of the plant.
7  Each plant is identified by a 
unique plant identifier.  The appearance of a new identification number implies necessarily 
that a new plant has entered, the disappearance of a previous number means that this plant has 
exited. If the number remains unchanged in subsequent years the plant has survived.   
Furthermore, RAMS reports firm and industry codes for each plant.   
 
The firm code attached to each plant enables us to match data from Financial Statistics (FC) 
including information at the firm-level such as labour productivity, capital-labour ratio, 
exports, whether a firm is multi- or single-plant, and ownership status (foreign or domestic).  
A firm is foreign if foreign owners posses more than 50 percent of the voting rights.  Using 
this data we define a foreign acquisition as a change in the ownership indicator from domestic 
to foreign.
8  The firm-level variables are available from the year 1993 and onwards only for 
larger firms, i.e. firms with 50 employees and more.  
 
The database provided by ITPS is a register of all Swedish firms that are multinational 
enterprises (MNE).
9  By merging the three databases using the firm identifier of plants, we 
                                                 
7 We have access to plant-level data from 1986 onwards. For plants entering after 1986 we are able to calculate 
the exact plant age, while older plants are improperly assigned to enter in 1986. 
8 Plants within firms that switch between domestic and foreign ownership more than once over the period are not 
included in the sample.  Also, plants in firms that disappear from the sample one year and reappear in later years 
are also excluded.  
9 The first year we can distinguish Swedish MNEs from non-MNEs is 1993 and explains why our analysis 
begins in 1993. 
  6can assign the firm level information to the plant level data. In that way we can also separate 
plants into those within foreign MNEs, plants part of a Swedish MNE, plants part of an 
exporting (non-MNE) firm and plants that operate purely domestically. A Swedish MNE is 
defined as a domestically owned firm which is part of an enterprise group with affiliates 
abroad.  In foreign-owned firms, foreigners possess more than 50 percent of the voting rights.   
 
The clear distinction into different types of MNEs and exporting activities is a distinct 
advantage of our data over the previous literature.  This is an important dimension to the 
analysis since the prospect of survival and employment growth may differ between ownership 
structures due to their ex-ante different characteristics as highlighted by, for example, 
Helpman et al. (2004).  Moreover, with our data we can be confident, given that it covers the 
whole population of plants, that we observe true exits and do not confound them with (i) 
disappearance of a plant code due to mergers & acquisitions, or (ii) a plant dropping out of a 
sample due to size thresholds for inclusion in the sample.
10  Furthermore, our data covers the 
1990s and early 2000s, which is a particularly interesting period to study given recent 
increases in international merger activity.   
 
During the 1990s, Sweden went through a period of liberalization reforms in order to promote 
foreign ownership.  Since then, foreign ownership increased rapidly and the trend seems to 
have been more pronounced in Sweden than in other OECD countries (see Hansson et al., 
2007).  Table 1 shows that in the 1990s, the employment share in plants within foreign MNEs 
increased by almost 27 percentage points. This trend seems to have evolved at the expense of 
Swedish MNEs whose employment share dropped by 21 percentage points.  The table also 
shows that over the period 1993 to 2002, the share of plants within foreign MNEs increased 
from 26 percent to 41 percent, whereas the share of plants within Swedish MNEs has fallen 
by almost 7 percentage points.  The employment and plant shares for Swedish exporters 
remained fairly constant over the period, however.   
 
Table 1 here 
 
                                                 
10 Our data, due to the restrictions of the FC database, only include firms with 50 employees or more. However, 
since we use plant-level data for the population of plants from RAMS we still can observe all the plants that are 
within a firm, even if that firm drops below the threshold size value.  Hence, contrary to some papers in the 
literature, we do not mix sample exit with true exit. 
  7During the 1990s several large Swedish multinationals have become foreign-owned due to 
acquisitions by foreign MNEs, e.g. Pharmacia and Upjohn 1995, Saab Automobile and 
General Motors 1998, Astra and Zeneca 1999 and Ford and Volvo Car Corporation 1999. 
Table 2 reports, by year, the frequencies of plant acquisitions by foreign firms.  On average 33 
percent of plants acquired were part of Swedish MNEs before foreign takeover, and almost 58 
percent were plants of Swedish exporters.  Table 2 also shows that more than 90 percent of 
the employees in the takeover targets were employed in plants part of Swedish MNEs or 
Swedish exporters before foreign acquisition.
11 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 3 shows that in the years before acquisition, plants within acquired firms are larger in 
terms of employment and are younger than plants of non-acquired firms.  Moreover, the 
acquired firms seem to have higher skill and R&D intensity, higher labour productivity and 
capital-labour ratios and are more export intensive than non-acquired firms in the pre-
acquisition years.  Table 3 also provides us with some evidence of “cherry picking”, i.e. that 
firms that perform “well” and have plants with “good” characteristics are more likely to be 
acquired by foreigners.   
 
Table 3 here 
 
Differences in characteristics and performance between acquired and non-acquired plants in 
the years before acquisition could bias the estimates of the causal effect of foreign acquisition 
on plant survival or employment growth.  To overcome this problem, we use various 
econometric methods, which we discuss in detail in the following sections.  We examine 
firstly the impact of foreign acquisition on plant survival, i.e., adjustment after acquisition 
along the extensive margin.   
 
 
4.  Foreign acquisition and plant survival 
 
4.1 Methodology  
 
                                                 
11 In the appendix in Table A1 we show the distribution of acquisitions by plant and firm across manufacturing 
sectors.  Over the period studied, 12 percent of all manufacturing firms were acquired by foreign firms (Recall 
that firm level information is only available for firms with 50 or more employees.)  Over the same period, 7 
percent of all plants were acquired.  Moreover, the shares of foreign acquisitions are more pronounced in sectors 
with a high degree of product differentiation and high R&D intensity such as chemicals, metals and motor 
vehicles. 
  8To establish whether the acquisition of a plant by foreign owners changes its survival 
prospects compared to other plants we model the determinants of plant survival and check 
whether the incidence of acquisition is a statistically significant determinant of a plant's 
hazard of exiting.  We use a complementary log-log model (cloglog) for the empirical 
estimations.
12  The underlying assumption of the proportional hazard model is that the hazard 
ratio depends only on time at risk,  ) ( 0 t θ  (the so-called baseline hazard) and on explanatory 
variables affecting the hazard independently of time,  ) ´ exp( X β . The hazard ratio is then 
given by:  
 
 ) ´ exp( ) ( ) , ( 0 X t X t β θ θ =  (1) 
 
More specifically, the discrete-time hazard function takes the following form: 
 
  [ ] ) ´ exp( exp 1 ) , ( j X X j h γ β + − − =  (2) 
 
where  shows the interval hazard for the period between the beginning and the end of 
the j
th year after the first appearance of the plant and   capture, within each 
interval, period specific effects on the hazard.  The 
) , ( X j h
dt t
j
j
a
a j ∫
−
=
1
) ( log 0 θ γ
β  parameters show the effects of the 
explanatory variables X (at the plant and firm level) on the hazard rate.
13 
 
The main interest in our analysis is a dummy variable showing whether a plant is part of a 
Swedish firm that has been acquired by a foreign MNE (Foreign Acquired).  The dummy 
switches to one in the year that the firm changes its ownership status from domestic to 
foreign, and is zero if ownership status is domestic.   
 
                                                 
12 The related empirical IO literature (e.g., Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995, Disney et al., 2003) generally uses a 
Cox proportional hazard model for this type of analysis.  Given that our data are collected on a yearly basis, the 
cloglog model is more appropriate.  Essentially, it is equivalent to the discrete time version of the proportional 
hazard model. The cloglog model has the same assumptions on the coefficient vector β as the continuous-time 
version of the proportional hazard model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). 
13 The cloglog model does not allow for unobserved plant heterogeneity.  To do so we use the random-effects 
version of complementary log-log model as a robustness check.  As these estimations produce results that are 
largely comparable with the simple cloglog model, we only report in the Appendix (Table A4) estimations of the 
preferred specifications using this alternative estimator, to save space.   
  9To be able to identify the acquisition effect we need to control for other plant level variables 
that are potentially correlated with it and that also affect plant survival.  The literature 
generally finds that plant size and age are important determinants of plant survival.  We, 
therefore, include both variables in the vector X.  Size is measured as log employment size 
and plant age as years of operations.  Furthermore, we calculate a measure of skill intensity of 
a plant’s production process.  This is defined as the percentage of employees with post-
secondary education in a plant relative to the industry mean skill intensity.   
 
We also take into account variables at the firm level.  We include a dummy capturing whether 
or not a firm is a multi-plant operation.  This has been shown by Bernard and Jensen (2007) as 
an important determinant of firm survival.  We also go further than this and check whether 
restructuring within the firm affects plant survival.  To do so, we calculate a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if another plant in the same firm exited, either as a result of the foreign 
acquisition or due to other reasons. Furthermore, we control for R&D intensity, capital 
intensity, and labor productivity at the firm level.   
 
The final baseline hazard model can then be written as: 
 
[ ] ) _ _ exp( exp 1 ) , ( 3 2 1 0 j controls firm controls plant Acquired X j h γ β β β β + + + + − − =    (3) 
 
We expand on this baseline model in the empirical analysis in a number of ways.  First, we 
include a dummy variable for domestic acquisitions in order to identify whether the variable 
captures a general acquisition effect or some specifically foreign effect.  Second, we allow the 
effects of foreign acquisitions to differ for horizontal and vertical acquisitions (the definitions 
of these are discussed below).  Third, we allow the acquisition effect to differ across plants 
depending on whether they are within globally engaged firms, i.e. Swedish MNEs and 
exporting non-MNEs, or purely domestic firms before foreign takeover.  This accounts for an 
important aspect of firm heterogeneity highlighted in the recent theoretical and empirical 
literature, namely, that there is a clear ordering of firm types, with the “best” becoming 
outward investors, the next exporters, and the least equipped firms remaining in the domestic 
market (Helpman, et al., 2004).  This can have implications for the post-acquisition survival 
prospects. 
 
  10In  Table 4 we calculate simple Kaplan-Meier survival functions to compare survival 
probabilities of the three different types of firms.  As the table shows, Swedish multinationals 
have the lowest survival probabilities, i.e., they are the most footloose of the type.  This is in 
line with the empirical finding that foreign multinationals have higher exit probabilities than 
purely domestic firms (e.g., Bernard and Sjöholm, 2003) – i.e., domestic multinationals are 
similar to foreign multinationals in this respect.
14  By contrast, there is no clear difference in 
survival probabilities between purely domestic plants and exporters; the functions cross at 
time t = 3.   
 
Table 4 here 
 
Before proceeding to the estimation results we need to describe in more detail our 
identification strategy.  In equation (3) identification of the coefficient β1 on the acquisition 
dummy rests on the assumption that, conditional on the plant and firm controls included, 
acquisition is exogenous.  This is, arguably, a strong assumption.  If it does not hold, then the 
stochastic dependence between the acquisition dummy and the error term may bias our 
estimates.  In order to take account of this possible endogeneity we use two approaches: 
instrumental variables estimation and selection of a control group based on propensity score 
matching.   
 
For the first approach we construct an instrumental variable as the probability of a firm being 
taken over by foreign owners.  This instrumental variable is calculated as the predicted value 
of the dependent variable from a probit regression for the probability of foreign takeover.
15   
The probit model is 
 
() ( ) t j it it D D X F n Acquisitio p , , 1 1 − = =      (4) 
                                                 
14 This mirrors recent contributions to the literature on productivity differences between multinationals and 
domestic firms which show that it is multinationality per se, and not foreign ownership, which is correlated with 
a productivity premium vis-a-vis domestic firms.  In other words, domestic and foreign multinationals are more 
productive than purely domestic firms.  See, for example, Criscuolo and Martin (2008) using UK data.   
15 A similar approach was taken by McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) who analyse the effect of acquisitions on 
plant exit in the US, and Hujer et al. (1999) in a nonlinear hazard model for the analysis of the effect of training 
on unemployment duration in Germany.  Conyon et al. (2002) also use this approach in modelling the wage 
effects of foreign acquisitions.  Note that, in order to get accurate standard errors for the estimators using 
generated IV we compute bootstrapped standard errors. 
  11where X is a vector of firm and plant characteristics in t-1.  This vector includes, in the first 
instance, labor productivity in firm i, plant age, age-squared, current employment size 
(relative to the industry mean), R&D and skill intensity, export intensity, and a measure of 
foreign presence in the industry.  The latter measure captures potential spillover effects in an 
industry.    and   control for fixed industry and time effects.  In a robustness check we 
also investigate how robust results are to changes in the variables that are included in the 
probit.   
j D t D
 
The results of estimating equation (4) are reported in Table 5.  The estimation results suggest 
that more productive, skill intensive and export oriented plants are more likely to be acquired.  
Furthermore, firms located in industries with higher foreign presence are more likely to 
become acquisition targets.  We also estimated alternative specifications of equation (4), 
including additional variables in the probit estimation, to check whether our results depend on 
the process by which the instrument was generated.  These results are reported on columns (ii) 
and (iii) of the table.  The estimation of the hazard models below is robust to this change in 
the instrument generating specification.   
 
Table 5 here 
 
In an alternative approach we use propensity score matching to establish a valid 
counterfactual of non-acquired firms which have similar pre-acquisition characteristics to the 
acquired firms. Under the matching assumption, conditional on the propensity score, 
acquisition is random.  We then carefully construct a sample of acquired plants and matched 
non-acquired plants, and estimate equation (3) on this matched sample.
16 
 
The idea of the propensity score matching method is to find, for every foreign acquired firm, a 
similar firm that has remained in domestic hands and from which we can approximate the 
non-observed counterfactual event. Thus, the matching technique enables us to construct a 
sample of acquired and non-acquired firms with similar pre-acquisition characteristics X, e.g. 
productivity, wages, size etc. Conditional on these characteristics we estimate the probability 
                                                 
16 A similar approach of using matching to establish a control group was employed by Greenaway and Kneller 
(2008).  See also Arnold and Javorcik (2005), Girma and Görg (2007a) and Petkova (2007) for recent 
applications of propensity score matching, and descriptions of the assumptions and tests, in the context of 
identifying the effects of foreign acquisitions on target firms.   
  12(or propensity score) of being acquired by a foreign firm using the same probit model as in 
equation (4).  
 
Once the propensity scores are calculated, we can (using the “caliper” matching method) 
select the nearest control firms in which the propensity score falls within a pre-specified 
radius as a match for an acquired firm.
17 Moreover, we check whether the balancing condition 
is verified, that is each independent variable do not differ significantly between acquired and 
non-acquired firms. 
 
Another condition that must be fulfilled in the matching procedure is the so-called common 
support condition. This criterion implies that at each point in time, a newly acquired firm is 
matched with non-acquired firms with propensity scores only slightly larger or smaller than 
the target firm.  Note that some acquired firms may be matched with more than one non-
acquired firm, while acquired firms not matched with a non-acquired firm are excluded.   
Eventually, we end up with a sample, henceforth denoted the matched sample, which consists 
of 207 acquired firms with 907 plants and 2,372 non-acquired firms with 10,776 plants.  
 
Since the aim of the matching is to find a group of acquired and non-acquired firms with 
similar characteristics we once more report, in the appendix in Table A2, mean variable 
differences between the two groups of firms that were successfully matched together. The 
matching procedure has substantially reduced the firm-level differences between acquired and 
non-acquired firms. Regarding the plant-level characteristics, the differences are slightly 
reduced as compared to the unmatched sample in Table 3. However, there still are significant 
differences between plants of acquired firms and plants of non-acquired firms. Hence, in the 
estimation of the hazard model we control for variations among the plants with respect to size, 
age and skill intensities. Finally, from Table A3 in the appendix it is clear that the matching 
procedure also has been successful in constructing a sample with the same structure of 
ownership changes as in the unmatched sample.  
 
4.2 Empirical results 
 
To examine whether survival prospects differ across foreign-acquired and non-acquired 
plants, we estimate different specifications of the hazard model described in equation (3). 
                                                 
17 The procedure we utilize to match acquired and non-acquired firms is the PSMATCH2 routine in Stata version 
10 described in Leuven and Sianesi (2003). In our analysis, the pre-specified radius is set to 0.01. 
  13We report the hazard ratios (exponentiated coefficients) which allow a straightforward 
interpretation of the coefficient size.  For example, a ratio β less than one on a dummy 
variable implies that changing the dummy from 0 to 1 reduces the hazard rate of exiting (or 
increases the probability of survival) by (1 – β ) * 100 percent, ceteris paribus.   
 
Table 6 presents the main estimation results. In the first four columns we report the result 
from estimating equation (3) for the whole sample, i.e. Swedish manufacturing plants in firms 
with 50 employees or more between 1993 and 2002. The results in column (i) are based on 
estimation of the hazard model assuming that foreign acquisitions are exogenous conditional 
on the control variables.  The column reveals that plants of acquired firms are more likely to 
survive than plants of non-acquired firms. Controlling for plant and firm level characteristics, 
acquisition by foreign owners increases a plant’s probability of survival by roughly 30 
percent.   
 
In terms of the control variables it is reassuring to note that their results are largely as 
expected.  In line with the large IO literature on firm survival we find that older, larger and 
more skill intensive plants have lower exit hazards.  We do not find that plants that are part of 
a multiplant firm per se are more or less likely to exit than other plants.  However, we do find 
evidence that a plant’s exit probability is reduced if another plant in the same firm failed.  
Furthermore, plants in firms with higher labor productivity, and lower capital intensities, are 
more likely to survive.   
 
Returning to the effect of acquisition on survival, our results thus far suggest that this is 
positive.  However, this may be purely due to foreign acquirers choosing targets with a priori 
positive characteristics, a practice known as “cherry picking”, as illustrated above in Tables 3 
and 5.  These characteristics may also account for the higher survival probabilities of such 
plants after acquisition.  To some extent, this is already accounted for by the large number of 
relevant firm and plant characteristics that we include in our empirical model.  However, we 
also explicitly correct for the possible endogeneity of the foreign acquisition dummy.  To this 
end we firstly estimate a variant of the hazard model in equation (3) which instruments for the 
acquisition dummy using the probability of foreign acquisition (as in Table 5) as an 
instrument.  As an alternative we use a propensity score matching approach in column (v). 
 
  14The results based on the three alternative instrumental variables are reported in columns (ii) to 
(iv).  Unfortunately there is, to the best of our knowledge, no formal method of choosing 
between the standard and the IV estimation in the context of a hazard model.  Hence, 
preference of the IV model would be predicated on the assumption of endogenous 
acquisitions which is, strictly speaking, not reliably testable.  However, we may use a 
standard Hausman test to get a rough indicator of whether or not the assumption of exogeneity 
holds.  These tests, which are reported at the bottom of Table 6 provide evidence that in all 
cases we can reject the assumption of exogeneity of the acquisition dummy.   
 
These results show that the point estimate of the effect of acquisition on exit is reduced (the 
coefficient is higher) and it is only statistically significant in one case in column (iv).  The 
reliability of the IV approach hinges on the relevance and validity of the instruments used.  
While the relevance is to some extent shown in the IV generating probit in Table 5, there is, to 
the best of our knowledge, no test of instrument validity in the context of this non-linear 
hazard estimation.  Hence, our results are reliable under the assumption of instrument validity, 
which cannot be tested.   
 
We therefore use an approach which does not depend on such an assumption.  We implement 
a propensity score matching procedure to generate a sample of acquired and non-acquired 
(matched) firms which can serve as a valid counterfactual.  We then estimate equation (3) on 
this matched sample of firms, similar to Greenaway and Kneller (2007).  The results are 
reported in column (v).  Note that the acquisition effect is now statistically significant and 
positive.  The point estimate suggests that the probability of surviving in plants within 
acquired firms is around 20 percent higher than in plants within non-acquired firms.   
 
Table 6 here 
 
We now consider various extensions to the baseline model.  The first extension is concerned 
with the acquisition effect as such.  The foreign acquisition effect we identify in the baseline 
estimation arguably includes two distinct components.  First, acquisitions may affect plant 
survival independent of whether the acquirer is foreign or domestic.  This may be termed a 
“pure acquisition effect”.  Second, there may be a differential effect of foreign and domestic 
acquisitions, which may be considered as a “foreign effect”.  The analysis in the baseline 
model bundles these two effects together.  This is a common problem in the literature (e.g., 
  15Arnold and Javorcik, 2005; Girma and Görg, 2007a, Petkova, 2007) and is usually difficult to 
address due to data limitations.   
 
With our Swedish data we can make some progress on this issue.  While, as in many other 
datasets, we do not observe domestic acquisitions directly we exploit the firm and plant 
dimension in our data.  Specifically, plant and firm identifiers are linked together so we can 
follow the entity along both dimensions.  If a plant remains within the same firm, both plant 
and firm identifier stay the same.  If we observe a firm in t-1 but not in t, but observe its plants 
in both years, the plants will have a constant plant identifier but different “old” and “new” 
firm identifiers in t-1 and t respectively.  We may then conclude from the data that the firm 
was acquired and that the new firm identifier relates to the acquiring firm.  If this firm is not 
foreign, then we define this as a domestic takeover.  In this way we identify 625 domestic 
acquisitions over the time period analysed in our data.   
 
Another issue concerns the nature of the foreign acquisition.  The literature broadly 
distinguishes foreign direct investments into horizontal and vertical (e.g, Alfaro and Charlton, 
2009).  There may arguably be different effects of foreign acquisitions on targets depending 
on these two motives.  For example, horizontal acquisitions may involve substantial transfers 
of technology from the parent to the target, which may increase survival.  However, it may 
also be about trying to eliminate rivals or consolidate the number of plants, leading to 
negative effects on survival probabilities.  By contrast, acquisitions of vertically related 
suppliers may more likely lead to transfer of technology to improve or sustain quality, and 
hence may lead to strong positive effects on survival.   
 
This is an issue that has not been investigated in the literature thus far, mainly due to data 
availability.  We use our data and check the industry classification for the acquired firm 
before and after acquisition.  If the two digit industry code remains constant, we define the 
acquisition as horizontal.  If it is changed, it is instead regarded as vertical.  Using this 
definition we classify about 11 percent of all foreign acquisitions in our sample as “vertical”.  
This is not an ideal measure by any means.  In particular, it is likely that our vertical group 
includes both “true” vertical acquisitions of, say, supplier firms, but also conglomerate 
mergers where the target and acquirer are in unrelated industries.  Unfortunately, we do not 
have sufficient information to establish industry linkages.  Still, the measure allows us to 
compare horizontal and other types of acquisitions.  In order to do so we allow for separate 
  16acquisition effects for horizontal and vertical acquisitions.  This is done interacting a dummy 
for horizontal acquisitions and the foreign acquisition dummy, and similarly for vertical 
acquisitions.   
 
The results of estimating equation (3) with these two modifications are reported in Table 7.  
Columns (i) to (iii) show the IV estimations.  We use instruments for both foreign and 
domestic acquisition dummies.  The instrument for the latter is constructed also using a probit 
equation of the probability of domestic acquisition, similar to equation (4).  However, this 
probit model does not include the presence of foreign firms in the industry as regressor.  From 
the IV estimations we find statistically significant positive effects from vertical acquisitions, 
while there is no evidence for an acquisition effect from horizontal takeovers.  We also find 
that domestic acquisitions lead to improvements in the survival probabilities of the domestic 
plants, and these effects appear to be stronger than for foreign acquisitions.  This conclusion 
also holds in the matching approach in column (iv), although the magnitude of the effects is 
reduced.   
 
In column (iv) the matching is done using a probit modelling the determinants of the 
probability of acquisition, not distinguishing foreign and domestic.  If the determinants are 
different for these two types of acquisitions, the matching procedure is not correct.  We 
therefore provide two alternative estimations.  In the first we only look at foreign acquisitions.  
We match using the probit model as described above and exclude from the sample all firms 
that are acquired by domestic firms.  The results are reported in column (v).  In the second 
approach we match only domestic acquisitions, excluding foreign acquisitions from the 
sample. The results are reported in column (vi).  Both columns show results that are consistent 
with what we found in column (iv).   
 
Table 7 here 
 
In Table 2, we observed that, on average almost 90 percent of the plants that are within 
foreign acquired firms were plants of globally engaged firms, i.e. Swedish MNEs and 
exporting non-MNEs, before acquisition.  We may expect that the survival prospect after 
foreign takeover differs depending on whether the plants were within targeted Swedish 
MNEs, exporting non-MNE or purely domestic firms.  The recent literature on firm level 
heterogeneity makes the point that these firms have, a priori, differences in their 
  17characteristics (Helpman et al., 2004).  This may not only affect their likelihood of being a 
takeover target but also the post acquisition effects on survival, as discussed above.   
 
To investigate whether there are indeed differences, we replace our foreign acquisition 
dummies in equation (3) with dummies showing the ownership status before foreign takeover; 
Acquired Swedish MNE, Acquired Swedish exporter and Acquired Swedish domestic. The first 
dummy equals one if the plants were within Swedish MNEs before foreign takeover and zero 
if the plants are within non-acquired firms. The second dummy takes the value of one if the 
plants were within exporters (non-MNEs) before foreign takeover and the last dummy shows 
whether the plants were within purely domestic firms before foreign takeover. We again allow 
the coefficients to be different for horizontal and vertical acquisitions.   
 
Table 8 shows the results, which indicate that plants that are within targeted Swedish 
exporters have higher survival ratios after foreign takeover as compared to plants within non-
acquired firms.  These results are similar in direction for horizontal and vertical acquisitionis, 
but stronger in magnitude for the latter.  These findings are also robust to the estimation 
strategy.  The most conservative estimates in column (iv) and (v) suggest the survival ratio for 
acquired exporters improves by between 17 to 34 percent after foreign takeover for vertical, 
and 6 to 8 percent for horizontal acquisitions.  There is, however, no robust evidence that 
acquisition impacts on the survival probabilities of either Swedish MNEs or purely domestic 
firms. This indicates that just looking at the acquisition effect without considering 
heterogeneity in the impact depending on firm characteristics may lead to biased conclusions.  
We show that only exporters experience increases in their survival prospects, and that it 
matters whether the acquisition is horizontal or non-horizontal.
18   
 
Why do we not find any effects for acquired MNEs or purely domestic firms?  The former 
may be quite similar to their acquirer and, hence, have little to learn in terms of new 
technology coming in. This ties in with recent empirical work on productivity differences 
between firms, which shows that multinationals, regardless of whether they are domestic or 
foreign owned, have a productivity premium compared to purely domestic firms (Criscuolo 
and Martin, 2008).  By contrast, purely domestic firms may be quite different from the 
acquirer in terms of their pre-acquisition characteristics.  In fact, they may be too different to 
                                                 
18 Table A4 in the appendix presents the results estimating the specifications in columns (i) to (iv) using the 
random effects version of the cloglog model.  These results are identical to those reported in Table 8.   
  18absorb the new knowledge and, hence, are not able to improve their survival chances 
significantly.  Only exporters, which have a certain level of “absorptive capacity”, may be 
able to use the new knowledge that comes in with the foreign acquirer.   
 
Table 8 here 
 
5   Employment effects 
 
Thus far we have considered the extensive margin of adjustment, namely the survival of the 
plants.  Plant closure is, of course, not the only mechanism of adjustment after foreign 
acquisition.  The acquisition may also lead to adjustment along the intensive margin for 
surviving plants, whereby the scale of the operations may be reduced or increased.  Here we 
look at employment adjustment, as this is one of the most policy relevant plant performance 
measures, as it directly relates to concerns about job losses following foreign takeovers of 
previous national firms.   
 
In order to estimate the impact of ownership change on employment growth in acquired plants 
we adopt a differences-in-differences methodology.  The first step proceeds by comparing the 
average employment growth E &  before acquisition with its post-acquisition counterpart.   
However, the resulting quantity, say,  E a & Δ , is a biased estimator of the impact of the 
ownership change on employment growth since it is likely to be affected by other factors 
which are contemporaneous with the acquisition.  Now consider the changes in employment 
growth of the control plants corresponding to the pre and post acquisitions periods, say,  E c & Δ .  
If exogenous shocks which are contemporaneous with the acquisitions affect the acquired and 
control firms in more or less similar fashions, the differences-in-differences estimator which 
is defined as   would purge the effects of common shocks and provide an 
unbiased estimator of the impact of ownership change.  
E E c a & & Δ − Δ = δ
 
To implement the above methodology within a regression framework, one can estimate the 
following equation, using the sample of acquired plants plus the control group: 
 
it i it n Acquisitio E ε δ α + + = &      (5) 
 
  19Here i and t index plants and time periods respectively and Acquisition is as before a dummy 
equal to one if the plant is acquired by a foreign owner.  In equation (5) the estimator for δ  
yields the average percentage point change in the growth rate of employment that can be 
attributed to foreign acquisitions.   
 
In our empirical implementation, we extend the basic regression framework in several 
directions.  Firstly, we allow for different effects of foreign acquisitions of Swedish MNEs, 
exporters, and purely domestic firms, as in the hazard model in Table 8.  We also include 
interaction terms for vertical acquisitions, and include a dummy for domestic acquisitions in 
the control group in order to identify a ”foreign acquisition” effect.  Furthermore, year 
dummies and industry-specific effects are included to capture aggregate shocks and 
permanent differences in the trend of employment growth across sectors respectively.  A 
vector of plant and firm characteristics is also included to control for observable changes that 
are potentially correlated with employment changes.  This vector consists of the growth of 
labor productivity, capital intensity and R&D intensity, plant age, employment level in t-1, 
plants skill intensity relative to the industry mean skill intensity, a dummy capturing whether 
the plant belongs to a multi-plant firm and a dummy variable that is equal to one if another 
plant in the same firm exited. 
 
The above methodology assumes that foreign acquisitions are exogenous to the process 
underlying the process of employment dynamics of the acquired plants.  However, if 
employment growth plays some role in driving acquisitions, then it is possible that the 
acquisition indicators may be endogenous to equation (5).  As above, possible endogeneity 
may be allowed for by using the estimate of the probability of foreign acquisition as an 
instrument, or selecting a control group based on propensity score matching.
19   
 
The results of the estimation of equation (5) using IV estimation as well as estimation of the 
model using a matched sample are reported in Table 9.  What is notable is that adjustment 
along the intensive margin of employment is somewhat different than adjustment along the 
extensive margin of plant survival.  While we found that both vertical and horizontal foreign 
acquisitions raise the survival probabilities of domestic exporters (not MNEs) only, 
employment growth is higher after vertical acquisitions in Swedish exporters.  Based on the 
                                                 
19 Vella and Verbeek (1999) have shown that this type of instrumental variables (IV) approach generates 
estimates comparable to Heckman's (1978) well-known endogeneity bias corrected OLS estimator. 
  20matched sample in column (iv), a foreign acquisition leads to an increase in employment 
growth by roughly 4 to 5 percent for Swedish exporters.  Furthermore, we find that the effect 
of domestic acquisitions is also positive, but only statistically significant in two out of four 
cases.  As before, we still find, however, that there are no foreign acquisition effects if the 
target is a purely domestic firm.  The post acquisitions effects for Swedish MNE are positive, 
but not robust across different estimation techniques.   
 
Table 9 here 
 
 
6.   Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the effect of foreign acquisition on plant survival and employment 
growth in the Swedish manufacturing during the 1990s. To this end we have used a unique 
dataset where firm and plant level information is linked together. This means that we are able 
to use firm information, as well as characteristics at the plant level. 
 
Controlling for possible endogeneity of the acquisition dummy by using an instrumental 
variable approach and a matched sample, and also controlling for other plant and firm specific 
characteristics, the result reveals that survival ratio for acquired exporters, but not other types 
of firms, improves post acquisition.  Depending on whether the acquisition is in the same 
industry (horizontal) or not (vertical) the point estimates suggest that survival increases by 
between 17 to 34 percent after foreign takeover for vertical, and 6 to 8 percent for horizontal 
acquisitions.  We also find that employment growth is higher in takeover targets that were 
exporters prior to acquisition.   
 
There are important implications of this finding for researchers and policy makers.  Firstly, 
foreign acquisition appears to have overall positive or neutral effects on survival and 
employment growth of targets.  There is no evidence of negative effects.  Hence, strong fears 
as to the sustainability of domestic industry in the light of increasing foreign acquisitions 
appear unfounded.  Secondly, when judging the magnitude of these effects it is important to 
take into account aspects of firm level heterogeneity, as not all types of firms benefit equally 
in terms of higher survival prospects or employment growth from foreign acquisition.   
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  24Table 1   Foreign MNEs, Swedish MNEs and exporting non-MNEs: Number of plants and 
employment shares 1993-2002 
    Foreign MNEs    Swedish MNEs    Exporting non-MNEs 
Year   Plants  Employment   Plants  Employment   Plants  Employment 
   (Percent)    Percent    (Percent)    Percent    (Percent)    Percent 
1993  1,402 (25.8)  21.5  1,722 (31.6)  53.3  1,141 (21.0)  16.1 
1994  1,476 (27.4)  21.1  1,911 (35.5)  57.3  1,141 (21.2)  14.8 
1995  1,534 (29.1)  22.0  1,618 (30.6)  55.1  1,156 (21.9)  15.3 
1996  1,624 (31.5)  27.4  1,495 (29.0)  50.4  1,238 (24.0)  14.9 
1997  1,490 (28.9)  27.8  1,761 (34.2)  51.8  1,044 (20.3)  14.7 
1998  1,686 (31.8)  30.8  1,536 (29.0)  48.4  1,077 (20.3)  15.3 
1999  1,774 (37.7)  34.9  1,180 (25.1)  43.6  943 (20.1)  16.1 
2000  1,837 (37.3)  41.1  1,385 (28.1)  38.8  958 (19.4)  14.7 
2001  2,051 (41.6)  46.8  1,216 (24.6)  32.2  954 (19.3)  16.0 
2002  1,815 (40.5)  48.3  1,123 (25.1)  32.3  850 (19.0)  13.1 
1993-2002  16,689 (32.9)  32.2  14,947 (29.5)  46.3  10,502 (20.7)  15.1 
  Number of unique plants 
1993-2002  4,305  (29.5)  4,684  (32.1)  3,047  (20.9)  
 
Table 2   Frequency of foreign acquisitions: Number of plants and employment shares  
  Swedish MNEs to 
foreign MNEs 
Exporting non-MNEs to 
foreign MNEs 
 Non-exporting non-MNEs to  
foreign MNEs 
Year   Plants  Employment   Plants  Employment   Plants  Employment 
   (Percent)    share*    (Percent)  share*    (Percent)    share* 
1994  7    (9.2)  19.4 51  (67.1)  66.7 18  (23.7)  13.9 
1995  19 (20.0)  30.0  74 (77.9)  68.8  2  (2.1)  1.2 
1996  161   (55.5)  72.1  123  (42.4)  26.1  6  (2.1)  1.8 
1997 8    (18.2)  26.0 23  (52.3)  57.8 13  (29.5)  16.2 
1998 25    (41.7)  74.8  34  (56.7)  19.4  1  (1.7) 5.9 
1999 78    (72.2)  77.3  23  (21.3)  15.3  7  (6.5) 7.4 
2000  20  (41.7)  88.0 14  (29.2)  10.6 14  (29.2)  1.4 
2001 5    (1.9)  4.0 217  (82.8)  85.0 40  (15.3)  11.0 
2002 13    (26.0)  26.9  34  (68.0)  65.8  3  (6.0) 7.3 
1993-2002  336  (32.5)  46.5 593  (57.4)  46.2 104  (10.1) 7.3 
Notes: * Share of total employment in plants within acquired firms  
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Table 3   Mean variable differences between acquired and non-acquired firms in the pre-
acquisition period, whole sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant variables  T=0  T=-1  T=-2 
Employment 
 
22 
(2.48)
*** 
35 
(3.71)
*** 
52 
(4.69)
*** 
     
Age 
 
-1.82 
(9.27)
*** 
-1.11 
(5.47)
*** 
-1.01 
(4.26)
*** 
     
Skill intensity 
 
-0.07 
(1.09) 
-0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(1.57) 
     
Obs. Target/Non-target  907/28,490  808/27,411 572/26,784
                     
Firm variables  T=0  T=-1  T=-2 
Employment 170 
(2.54)
** 
175 
(2.52)
** 
156 
(2.05)
** 
     
Skill intensity 
 
3.1 
(3.66)
*** 
2.5 
(2.93)
*** 
2.7 
(2.97)
*** 
     
R&D intensity 
 
0.7 
(2.52)
** 
0.8 
(2.98)
*** 
0.7 
(2.61)
*** 
     
Capital-labor  
Ratio 
39.6 
(0.64) 
75.5 
(2.22)
** 
39.0 
(1.06) 
     
Shipment 
 
451 
(1.76)
* 
444 
(1.90)
* 
389 
(1.68)
* 
     
Export intensity  
 
8.2 
(3.72)
*** 
8.1 
(3.60)
*** 
6.0 
(2.48)
** 
     
Productivity 
 
22.60 
(1.32) 
39.2 
(2.41)
** 
42.0 
(2.44)
** 
Obs.  Target/Non-target  207/7,456 198/6,932 168/6,425 
  26Table 4  Kaplan-Meier survival function, indigenous plants by firm type 
Time Whole  sample 
 Non-Exporter  Exporter  Swedish  MNE 
1 93.1 
(0.005) 
89.2 
 (0.006) 
86.5 
 (0.005) 
2 80.3 
(0.008) 
78.8 
(0.008) 
78.8 
(0.006) 
3 71.2 
(0.010) 
73.0 
(0.008) 
70.1 
(0.007) 
4 64.1 
(0.010) 
68.6 
(0.009) 
60.0 
(0.007) 
5 53.0 
(0.026) 
58.1 
(0.010) 
47.8 
(0.008) 
6 48.2 
(0.011) 
50.4 
(0.010) 
42.2 
(0.008) 
7 39.6 
(0.011) 
46.0 
(0.010) 
34.6 
(0.007) 
8 30.4 
(0.010) 
35.6 
(0.010) 
28.3 
(0.007) 
9 30.4 
(0.010) 
35.6 
(0.009) 
28.2 
(0.007) 
Notes: Standard error is within parentheses 
 
  27 
Table 5  Probability of foreign acquisition – The Probit model 
 
Variables (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
     
Export intensity   0.296  0.276  0.419 
 (3.42)
*** (3.17)
*** (8.25)
*** 
     
R&D  intensity  0.524 0.524 0.524 
  (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) 
     
Relative  employment  0.003 0.004 0.003 
  (1.01) (0.12) (1.48) 
     
Labor  productivity 0.127 0.065 0.207 
 (2.11)
** (0.98) (5.22)
*** 
     
Skill  intensity  0.077 0.087 0.160 
 (1.88)
* (2.17)
** (7.56)
*** 
     
Age  -0.077 -0.076 -0.048 
 (5.42)
*** (5.35)
*** (5.75)
*** 
     
(Age)
2  0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (4.35)
*** (4.21)
*** (5.52)
*** 
     
Foreign  presence  0.064 0.059 0.127 
 (2.14)
** (1.95)
* (7.33)
*** 
     
Capital  intensity   0.042  
   (2.11)
**  
     
Sales     0.016 
     (2.98)
*** 
     
Year  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R
2  0.050 0.052 0.054 
LR  chi2(16)  112.24 114.89 118.53 
Observations  9.716 9.716 9.716 
Notes: Z-statistics is within parenthesis.  Relative employment is firm’s employment relative to the industry 
mean employment. Apart from age and age
2, all the other variables are lagged one period. The share of foreign 
employment at industry level (SNI92 2-digit level) is used as proxy for foreign presence. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
  28Table 6    Result of Cox Hazard model. Foreign and domestic acquisition of plants 
of all Swedish manufacturing firms. 
 Exogenous 
acquisition 
IV 1  IV 2  IV 3  Matched 
sample 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
Foreign  acquisition  0.689 0.914 0.904 0.888 0.786 
 (8.91)
*** (0.94)  (1.13)  (1.78)
* (5.38)
*** 
       
Plant level controls       
Age  0.249 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.267 
 (77.90)
*** (79.65)
*** (69.19)
*** (74.63)
*** (58.30)
*** 
       
Size    0.817 0.818 0.818 0.818 0.825 
 (15.64)
*** (15.47)
*** (15.00)
*** (13.92)
*** (12.51)
*** 
       
Skill  intensity  0.986 0.986 0.986 0.986 0.997 
 (2.57)
*** (2.50)
** (2.76)
*** (2.43)
** (0.38) 
       
Firm level controls          
Multiplant  0.905 0.921 0.921 0.921 1.711 
  (1.22) (0.94) (1.02) (0.94)  (4.83)
*** 
       
Failed  other  plant  0.537 0.533 0.533 0.533 0.826 
 (16.32)
*** (16.03)
*** (16.55)
*** (16.15)
*** (4.34)
*** 
       
Capital  intensity 1.100 1.086 1.087 1.087 1.082 
 (9.61)
*** (7.87)
*** (8.63)
*** (8.38)
*** (6.52)
*** 
          
R&D  intensity  0.728 0.761 0.764 0.771 0.437 
  (0.86) (0.70) (0.84) (0.70)  (2.01)
** 
          
Labor  productivity  0.658 0.657 0.657 0.657 0.722 
  (11.81)
*** (11.11)
*** (11.68)
*** (13.48)
*** (7.45)
*** 
Observation  31,047 31,047 31,047 31,047 19,784 
Wald Chi Square  10,627  14,535  9,343  15,121  6,910 
Hausman test (p-value)    0.002 0.002 0.002   
Linktest  (hatsq) 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.005 -0.004 
  (1.25) (1.07) (1.38) (0.97) (0.40) 
Notes: Estimations are stratified by industry and year. Industries are defined at the SNI92 2-digit level (22 
industries). Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Only plants in firms with 50 employees or more are included.  
 
  29Table 7    Result of Cox Hazard model. Foreign and domestic acquisition of plants 
of all Swedish manufacturing firms. 
  IV  IV 2  IV 3  Matched 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
Vertical  acquisition    0.362 0.347 0.403 0.736 0.786   
 (2.88)
*** (3.02)
*** (2.92)
*** (6.81)
*** (4.67)
***   
        
Horizontal  acquisition  0.815 0.862 0.704 0.852 0.889   
  (0.09) (0.15) (1.07) (0.99) (0.81)   
        
Domestic  acquisition    0.176 0.188 0.166 0.466    0.424 
  (8.51)
*** (8.76)
*** (9.33)
*** (7.79)
***  ( 7 . 0 9 )
*** 
        
Plant level controls        
Age  0.264 0.247 0.246 0.278 0.261 0.267 
 (75.22)
*** (75.22)
*** (74.84)
*** (56.01)
*** (46.71)
*** (36.63)
*** 
        
Size    0.822 0.825 0.823 0.836 0.822 0.845 
 (15.29)
*** (15.32)
*** (15.21)
*** (11.54)
*** (10.17)
*** (7.54)
*** 
        
Skill  intensity  0.982 0.982 0.982 0.996 1.005 0.997 
 (3.22)
*** (3.21)
*** (3.22)
***  (0.64) (0.57) (0.31) 
        
Firm level controls     
   
Multiplant  0.878 0.875 0.886 1.812 1.900 1.547 
 (1.79)
* (1.85)
* (1.67)
* (5.28)
*** (4.72)
*** (2.18)
** 
        
Failed  other  plant 0.545 0.543 0.543 0.831 0.663 1.349 
 (14.95)
*** (14.99)
*** (14.98)
*** (4.17)
*** (7.35)
*** (4.23)
*** 
        
Capital  intensity  1.081 1.089 1.087 1.078 1.062 1.158 
 (7.63)
*** (8.47)
*** (8.18)
*** (6.18)
*** (3.79)
*** (8.50)
*** 
         
R&D  intensity  0.901 0.875 0.875 0.439 0.302 0.212 
  (0.28) (0.36) (0.36)  (1.99)
** (2.83)
*** (2.01)
** 
         
Labor  productivity 0.621 0.619 0.615 0.701 0.743 0.539 
  (13.43)
*** (13.56)
*** (13.60)
*** (8.24)
*** (5.26)
*** (11.39)
*** 
Observation  31,047 31,047 31,047 19,784 13,395  9,394 
Wald Chi Square  13,549  13,664  13,467  6,731  4,734  2,902 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.001  0.001  0.002       
Linktest  (hatsq)  0.006 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.021 -0.014 
  (1.06) (1.13) (1.06) (0.05)  (2.15)
** (1.19) 
Notes: Estimations are stratified by industry and year. Industries are defined at the SNI92 2-digit level (22 
industries). Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Only plants in firms with 50 employees or more are included. In column (v) plants within firms 
taken over by other domestic firms are excluded and in column (vi) plants within firms taken over by foreign 
MNEs are excluded.   
 
  30Table 8  Result of Cox Hazard model. Foreign acquisition of Swedish MNE plants and 
plants of exporting and non-exporting firms. 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v) 
  IV 1  IV 2  IV 3  Matched 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
Vertical acquired  
Swedish MNE 
0.643 
(1.94)
** 
0.775 
(1.78)
* 
1.387 
(0.63) 
0.866 
(1.69)
* 
1.014 
(0.11) 
       
Vertical acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.221 
(4.53)
*** 
0.235 
(4.70)
*** 
0.309 
(3.80)
*** 
0.658 
(3.67)
*** 
0.824 
(1.98)
** 
       
Vertical acquired  
Swedish domestic 
1.187 
(0.33) 
1.578 
(1.01) 
0.808 
(0.27) 
1.594 
(1.54) 
1.620 
(1.53) 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish MNE 
0.985 
(0.21) 
1.057 
(0.46) 
1.301 
(0.74) 
1.220 
(0.32) 
1.471 
(0.98) 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.700 
(2.35)
** 
0.750 
(2.29)
*** 
0.701 
(2.75)
*** 
0.920 
(2.08)
*** 
0.934 
(2.12)
*** 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish domestic 
1.352 
(0.55) 
2.162 
(0.96) 
1.750 
(0.96) 
2.645 
(1.22) 
1.061 
(0.88) 
       
Domestic  acquisition    0.186 0.191 0.157 0.467   
 (7.77)
*** (8.58)
*** (9.09)
*** (7.74)
*** 
 
       
Multiplant  0.891 0.890 0.897 1.854 1.974 
(Plant  level)  (1.29) (1.50) (1.36)  (5.49)
*** (5.04)
*** 
       
Failed  other  plant  0.541 0.540 0.541 0.826 0.671 
(Plant level)  (14.80)
*** (15.79)
*** (15.78)
*** (4.33)
*** (7.31)
*** 
     
  
        
Labor  productivity  0.613 0.610 0.608 0.700 0.778 
(Firm level)  (13.85)
*** (13.50)
*** (13.42)
*** (8.19)
*** (4.37)
*** 
        
Plant  controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm  controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observation  31,047 31,047 31,047 19,784 13,395 
Wald Chi Square  11,996  12,314  12,641  6,875  4,864 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.002  0.001  0.002     
Linktest  (hatsq)  0.010 0.007 0.007 -0.001 0.021 
  (0.98) (0.90) (0.90) (0.18)  (2.22)
*** 
Notes: Estimations are stratified by industry and year. Industries are defined at the SNI92 2-digit level (22 
industries). Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,* indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. Only plants in firms with 50 employees or more are included. In column (v) plants within firms 
taken over by other domestic firms are excluded. 
 
  31Table 9   Foreign and domestic acquisition of all Swedish manufacturing plants.  
Growth in employment as dependent variable. 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
  IV 1  IV 2  IV 3  Matched 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
Vertical acquired  
Swedish MNE 
0.088 
(1.90)
** 
0.078 
(1.84)
* 
0.052 
(1.63) 
0.021 
(1.67)
* 
0.025 
(1.71)
 * 
 
          
Vertical acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.112 
(2.49)
*** 
0.124 
(2.63)
*** 
0.117 
(2.62)
*** 
0.049 
(2.20)
*** 
0.046 
(1.97)
** 
 
          
Vertical acquired  
Swedish domestic 
0.066 
(1.49) 
0.068 
(1.69)
* 
0.023 
(1.27) 
0.011 
(1.03) 
0.014 
(1.10) 
 
          
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish MNE 
-0.033 
(0.31) 
-0.053 
(0.55) 
0.009 
(0.14) 
-0.002 
(0.04) 
0.012 
(0.22) 
 
          
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.027 
(0.44) 
0.023 
(0.11) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0.013 
(1.17)
  
0.013 
(0.73) 
 
          
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish domestic 
-0.048 
(1.55) 
-0.022 
(0.93) 
-0.013 
(0.54) 
-0.009 
(0.21) 
0.012 
(0.50) 
 
           
Domestic  acquisition  0.062 0.060 0.026 0.021    0.038 
 (1.70)
* (1.61) (0.63)  (2.79)
*** 
  (3.54)
*** 
           
Multiplant  -0.079 -0.080 -0.080 -0.090 -0.091  -0.110 
(Plant level)  (13.63)
*** (12.98)
*** (12.88)
*** (12.35)
*** (10.69)
*** (8.92)
*** 
          
Failed other plant  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010 -0.018 -0.005 -0.024 
(Plant level)  (1.75)
* (1.88)
* (1.63) (2.18)
** (0.50) (2.01)
** 
      
   
            
Growth in Labor productivity  0.018  0.019  0.018  0.014  0.019  -0.015 
(Firm level)  (2.11)
** (2.15)
** (2.00)
** (1.14)  (1.25)  (0.65) 
            
Plant  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm  controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observation  23,730 23,730 23,730 16,128 13,399  9,394 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03  0.03 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.002  0.002  0.001       
Notes: All regressions contain year and 2-digit industry dummies.  Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **,* 
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Only plants in firms with 50 employees or more 
are included. In column (v) plants within firms taken over by other domestic firms are excluded. 
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Table A1  Foreign acquisitions by sectors 1994-2002  
 
 
 Industry  Target 
firms 
Number of 
firms* 
Plants within 
target firms 
Number of 
plants* 
Acquisition share 
Percent 
           Firm  Plant 
Food, beverages and tobacco  14  179  246  2,821  7.8  8.7 
Textiles, apparel and leather  6  59  16  159  10.2  10.1 
Wood products  19  196  60  1,469  9.7  4.1 
Paper and pulp products  14  83  22  345  16.9  6.4 
Printing and publishing  13  255  43  2,706  5.1  1.6 
Chemicals 30  117  75  876  25.6  8.6 
Rubber and plastics  14  110  34  379  12.7  9.0 
Non-metallic products  13  79  166  739  16.5  22.5 
Basic metals  15  63  27  180  23.8  15.0 
Non-electrical machinery  31  297  52  1,017  10.4  5.1 
Electrical machinery  46  354  167  1,563  13.0  10.7 
Telecommunication 12  118  18  513  10.2  3.5 
Professional goods  6  66  20  488  9.1  4.1 
Motor vehicles  17  75  24  298  22.7  8.1 
Transport equipment   23  119  36  384  19.3  9.4 
and other manufacturing  15  177  27  660  8.5  4.1 
 Total  288  2,347  1,033  14,597  12.3  7.1 
Notes: *Unique number of firms and plants during the period in each sector. 
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Table A2   Mean variable differences between acquired and non-acquired firms in the pre-
acquisition period, matched sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plant variables  T=0  T=-1  T=-2 
Employment 
 
20 
(1.83)
* 
33 
(2.88)
*** 
49 
(3.67)
*** 
     
Age 
 
-1.40 
(6.85)
*** 
-0.7 
(3.49)
*** 
-0.61 
(2.58)
*** 
     
Skill intensity 
 
-0.10 
(1.55) 
-0.05 
(0.77) 
-0.19 
(2.21)
** 
     
Obs. Target/Non-target  907/10,776  808/10,387 572/10,121
                     
Firm variables  T=0  T=-1  T=-2 
Employment 78 
(0.88) 
76 
(0.81) 
46 
(0.44) 
     
Skill intensity 
 
0.9 
(0.86) 
0.3 
(0.32) 
0.6 
(0.55) 
     
R&D intensity 
 
0.1 
(0.37) 
0.2 
(0.67) 
0.1 
(0.36) 
     
Capital-labor  
Ratio 
23.6 
(0.68) 
50.0 
(1.37) 
16.3 
(0.43) 
     
Shipment 
 
285 
(1.13) 
252 
(0.95) 
172 
(0.60) 
     
Export intensity  
 
4.3 
(1.84)
* 
4.3 
(1.82)
* 
2.2 
(0.87) 
     
Productivity 
 
5.57 
(0.32) 
25.4 
(1.52) 
31.2 
(1.82)
* 
Obs.  Target/Non-target  207/2,372 198/2,240 168/2,114 
 
Table A3   The share of total number of firm and plant acquired by  
  foreign MNEs. Whole and matched sample 
 Whole  sample 
  Swedish MNEs  Exporting  
non-MNEs 
Non-Exporting 
non-MNEs 
  Firms Plants Firms Plants Firms Plants 
1993-2002  30.6 31.5 56.6 56.0 12.8 12.5 
 Matched  sample 
 Swedish  MNE  Exporter  Non-Exporter 
  Firms Plants Firms Plants Firms Plants 
1993-2002  29.6 30.3 57.5 57.0 12.9 12.7 
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Table A4  Result of the random-effects version of clog-log model.  
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
 IV  1  IV 2  IV 3  Matched 
sample 
       
Vertical acquired  
Swedish MNE 
0.751 
(1.71)
 * 
0.964 
(1.33) 
1.225 
(0.41) 
0.891 
(1.67)
 * 
       
Vertical acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.326 
(3.87)
*** 
0.317 
(3.96)
*** 
0.401 
(3.53)
*** 
0.752 
(3.02)
*** 
       
Vertical acquired  
Swedish domestic 
1.152 
(0.29) 
1.762 
(1.14) 
0.911 
(0.34) 
1.619 
(1.57) 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish MNE 
1.023 
(0.56) 
1.072 
(0.51) 
1.385 
(0.82) 
1.253 
(0.37) 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish exporter 
0.821 
(2.17)
** 
0.792 
(2.21)
*** 
0.809 
(2.19)
*** 
0.931 
(2.02)
*** 
       
Horizontal acquired  
Swedish domestic 
1.341 
(0.49) 
2.021 
(0.85) 
1.629 
(0.91) 
2.489 
(1.01) 
       
Domestic acquisition   0.224  0.271  0.247  0.557 
 (6.89)
*** (7.03)
*** (8.02)
*** (6.17)
*** 
       
Plant  controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm  controls  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observation  31,047  31,047 31,047 19,784 
Wald Chi Square  7,892  8,119  8,163  6,227 
Notes: 
Estimation in (i) replicates the specification in Table8, column (i) 
Estimation in (ii) replicates the specification in Table 8, column (ii) 
Estimation in (iii) replicates the specification in Table 8, column (iii) 
Estimation in (iv) replicates the specification in Table 8, column (iv) 
Plant and firm controls included but not reported to save space. 
For the estimations in columns (i) to (iv) we cannot reject the assumption that random effects are jointly equal to 
zero. 
 
 